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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF U T A H ,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent
v,

:

JOHN CHARLES CLOUD,

:

Case N o . 19884

D e f e n d an t - Ap p e 11 an t

BRIEF OF A P P E L L A N T
S T A T E M E N T OF THE CASE
The a p p e l l a n t , JOHN CHARLES CLOUD, [hereinafter referred
to as the defendant] appeals from a c o n v i c t i o n and judgment imposed
f • : r M a r d e z 1 i : l 11: i e S e c o n d D e g r e e , a f e 1 o n y o f t h e F :i r s t D e g r e e
p u r s u a n t to Utah Code A n n . §76-5-203 in the Third J u d i c i a l District
Court i n and for Salt Lake C o u n t y , State of U t a h , the Honorable
H o m e r I:; '. 'Wilkinson, J ixdge , p r e s i d i n g on M a r c h 8 , 1 9 8 4 .

S T A T E M E N T OF FACTS
On M a y 2 3 , 1 9 8 3 , Nyla Johnson was found dead In the apartment
w h e r e she and John Cloud resided, at 4370 Highland Drive In Salt
Lake C11y , U1: a 1 i (' i

2" ' 9)

J at ie NI ska 1 a , a f r I en d an d c o - •TOrke r

of M s . Johnson, had gone to the residence to pick her up for work
i' an[> roxima rH 1 v 7:40

i in

(T . 2 76 ) , When no one responded to

knocking on the door, Ms. Niskala entered and noticed blood on

the hallway floor (T. 279).

She looked into a bedroom and saw

a man in bed sleeping (T. 279). Ms. Niskala turned toward the
bathroom and discovered the body of Nyla Johnson on the bathroom
floor (T. 279). After taking a few steps closer to the body,
Ms. Niskala realized Nyla Johnson was dead (T. 282).

Jane then

departed and went to her place of employment where she called
Nyla Johnson's ex-husband, McKay Johnson (T. 284).
Upon receiving the call McKay Johnson went to the apartment
(T. 320). He entered and saw the defendant, John Cloud, standing
in the hall getting dressed (T. 320). Mr. Johnson asked John
Cloud what was happening and the defendant gave no reply (T. 321).
Mr. Johnson then proceeded down the hallway and discovered the
body of the victim and called an ambulance (T. 321-322) .

While

waiting for the ambulance the defendant told Mr. Johnson that
as he approached the front door, early that morning, a black man
exited the apartment wielding a large knife (T. 323). He further
stated that a struggle ensued during which his hands were cut
by the knife (T. 323).
When the police arrived they Questioned Mr. Cloud and he
repeatedly related essentially the same story of a black attacker
(T. 358).

The defendant told the police he had left the residence

the night before, Sunday, May 22nd and went to a nearby store
to buy beer and a loaf of bread (T. 382). He then drove to Liberty
Park to feed the ducks and later returned to the apartment parking
lot (T. 382). He stated that he fell asleep in the pick-up
truck not ax^akening until the early morning of May 23rd (T. 382).
When he approached the apartment he was attacked by the black

he e n t e r e d the r e s i d e n c e and d i s c o v e r e d the body of the victim
and called the police

i'l , jM.J id "i i

'I he poi ice q u e s t i o n e d n e i g h b o r s •

i n an attempt to determine if anyone had seen a black m a n m a t c h i n g
t h e d e s c r i p 1:1 < :) i i g i T e i 1 1: ;; J \ : • 1: IT i C 1 o i i 1
The State i n t r o d u c e d e v i d e n c e i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h M r . Cloud's
story.

T h e t e s t i m o n y of the m e d i c a l e x a m i n e r pi aced the time

of death around 1 i 30 a ,m. on M a y 23rd
with

(T

525)

i • 1 :n ltche" r 1 :

traces of blood w a s found inside the r e s i d e n c e and a n a l y z e d

f M r I J J <" 111 t y i>' s ,

T e s t j m o n• ? b j I lar t h a K e i r I i i d 1 c a t e d t ha. t two

types of blood found on the knife were consistent with, blood
taken from the defendant and Nyl a Johnson (T

446-470),

samples

Similarly,

numer ou s b 1 o o d s t a ine d e xh ib i t s f oun d ii i 11: ie ap ar trriei 11: we r e de t: e rm in e d
to be c o v e r e d w i t h b l o o d types c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the samples
f r oni M r , C1 • :> i I < I < ii i • I 1 1 i < =

1:;:

? I c t: i m ( T . • 4 6 5 - 4 7 \)

taken

Pho t o g r aph s t ak en

by the p o l i c e of the d e f e n d a n t ' s a n k l e s , feet and toes

showed

traces of dried b l o o d a l t h o u g h no traces of b l o o d w e r e found
the shoes he had been we ar ii Ig (I"

inside

3 8 8 - 3 9 ( )') .

At trial the defendant admitted to stabbing and

killing

t h e '"\ Ti c t i m a n< I s i ibseqi Ient: 1 y m« a.ki ng up the story of the b l a c k
(T. 6 0 0 , 6 0 4 ) , He m a i n t a i n e d t h r o u g h o u t his t e s t i m o n y that he
caused the death of the v i c t i m u n d e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s w h e r e he w a s
u n d e i: e x t: r e in e n I e x 1 1 a 1

: • i e in o t i o n a 1 d I s t r e s s .

John Cloud testified he had a serious alcohol problem., for
the past thirty years (T, 5 7 7 ) .

As a result of his alcoholism

he lost his family i i i 1 97 5 and subsequently his employment (I,
576)

John grieved over the divorce and the loss of his wife

a n d c '1: i i 1 d. r e n f o r t h e n e x t s e v e r a 1 y e a r s a n d 1 I i s a ] c o h o ] i c

assailant

condition worsened (T. 579-82).

During this period he sought

help for his alcohol problem by drifting from one rehabilitation
program to the next (T. 583).

Although he was enrolled in numerous

programs he was never able to complete any program and he continued
to suffer from accute alcohol abuse.

He arrived in Utah in early

1983 and enrolled in the Veteran's Administration Hospital Alcohol
and Drug Program (T. 590-591).
The defendant met Nyla Johnson at the Sojourner Club in
early March 1983 (T. 585).

Shortly thereafter, he moved into

her apartment and their relationship continued to develop (T.
588).

In April, 1983 they decided to marry and notified several

friends of their intentions (T. 589).
Mr. Cloud was deeply concerned about his and Nyla's alcohol
abuse problems and the impact that would have upon their relationship
(T. 597). He decided to again seek help and on May 1, 1983 enrolled
in the Odyssey House Program in Salt Lake City.

Feeling that

it was necessary to avoid contact with Nyla during this period,
he informed her, without explanation, that he was leaving for
Denver, Colorado (T. 598). While at Odyssey House he dedicated
himself to the program and dealing with his problem.

During this

time he continuously thought of Nyla and the changes he must make
to prepare for their upcoming marriage (T. 600).

However, on

May 21 without completing the program, John decided to check out
and return to Nyla (T. 602). Mr. Cloud called Nyla and explained
that he had been in a treatment program and asked if she could
pick him up about 5:30 p.m. (T. 602).
John was excited about being reunited with Nyla but his
enthusiasm was soon dampened at her apparent interest in another

person.

On the way home Nyla took an unexplained detour and drove

to an unknown address in a neighborhood unfamiliar to the defendant
(T. 603).

He asked Nyla what was occurring and she told him not

to ask (T. 604).

She only explained that she was engaged in "detective

work,f and after a few minutes continued on to her apartment (T.
604).

The next morning his suspicions were again aroused when

Nyla said she was going to leave for a few minutes and was gone
for about an hour.

He began to believe that Nyla was seeing another

man when she returned and refused to discuss where she had been
(T. 608). Later that afternoon Mr. Cloud became increasingly
concerned when Nyla again left for an hour and subseauently returned
without explanation (T. 609). The defendant testified that he
began drinking heavily that afternoon and became increasingly
frustrated by her continuing absence and her refusal to share
with him what she was doing (T. 609). Later in the afternoon
Nyla informed John that she had a date that evening but that it
meant nothing to her though she felt obligated to go (T. 611).
He became very upset and wanted to know what was happening to
their commitment to be married.

Nyla remained unresponsive to

his concerns (T. 611-612).
The defendant left the apartment and went to the store
and purchased some beer and bread (T. 612). He called his friend
Bob Stone to seek advice about what to do with his relationship
with Nyla (T. 612-613).

He asked to meet with Bob Stone but he

refused because John had been drinking (T. 613). The defendant
drove to Liberty Park and fed the ducks and thought about what
he should do (T. 613). After he returned to the apartment complex

John waited in the truck because he was afraid he would find Nyla
with another man (T. 613).
A short time later he went into the apartment and saw Nyla
on the end of the sofa going through her purse (T. 614). He told
her that they needed to talk about what was going on in their
lives (T. 614). He was upset and angry (T. 615).

He asserted

that they could not start a marriage under such circumstances
(T. 615) .

John testified that he started drinking large amounts

of liquor very quickly (T. 615).

He demanded to know who Nyla

was seeing and why she refused to discuss the matter (T. 615).
She went into the bathroom and he went into the kitchen and had
another stiff drink (T. 615).

The defendant then demanded Nyla

come to him in the front room and discuss the situation (T. 616).
She then told John that she did not want to have anyching to do
with him (T. 616) .

She said she was tired, wanted to forget the

marriage, and did not want to have anything to do with anybody
(T. 616). At that point John testified that he went crazy (T.
616-617).

His ears started ringing, and his "head just started

exploding" (T. 617).

He then got a knife, went into the bathroom

where she was standing and started swinging the knife and stabbing
her (T. 617).
Although John Cloud's memory was not complete, he did recall
sometime later seeing the victim laying on the floor (T. 617).
His hands were bleeding and he tried to wash them off (T. 617).
John went into the kitchen and drank a beer because his mouth
was dry (T. 618). He felt sick and dizzy so he went to bed (T.
618).

Sometime later in the morning he again got up and found

she was dead and what he had done.

He then became frightened

and concocted the story of the black assailant which he later
related to to Mr. Johnson and the police (T. 620).
Witnesses at trial verified the defendant's testimony concerning
the detective work of Nyla Johnson and John's concern over what
he felt was happening to their relationship.

Mr. Ed Barton, an

investigator for Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, testified
because of the unavailability of Ross Record (T. 568-578).

Mr.

Barton stated that Ross had told him that he was dating Nyla during
the time Mr. Cloud was in the Odyssey program (T. 575). Mr. Barton
further testified that Ross Record stated he had asked Nyla to
do some detective work concerning Ross' ex-wife on the weekend
Nyla died (T. 576). This was also confirmed by a co-worker of
Nyla, Bonnie Wilson, who testified that Nyla had asked her if
she had a camera and infra-red film.

Bonnie further testified

that Nyla wanted her to attempt to do some detective work that
weekend (T. 556-557).
Witnesses also testified regarding John's emotional state
just prior to Nyla's death.

Mark Crockett testified that on the

evening of Sunday, May 22nd, he overheard an angry male voice
from inside John and Nyla's apartment at around 7:30 p.m. although
he could not identify the voice, he stated it was clearly audible
in the hallway area (T. 374-375).

Bob Stone testified that John

had called him the evening of May 22nd, and that he was very upset
about his relationship with Nyla (T. 565). Mr. Stone stated that
he refused to meet with the defendant because he could tell that
he was upset and had been drinking (T. 565).

Dr. Louis G. Moench also testified regarding the defendant's
mental condition on May 22-23, 1983.

He said that Mr. Cloud had

a low frustration tolerance and he would react to a problem rather
than contemplate his options (T. 703).

He felt that John Cloud

had a problem with alcohol since 16 and had a family history of
alcoholism (T. 703). Dr. Moench further testified that drinking
had made Mr. Cloud paranoid and suspicious of others (T. 704).
As a result of the circumstances as viewed by the defendant and
alcoholic induced suspicion Dr. Moench stated that in his opinion
at the time that the defendant caused the death of Nyla Johnson,
he was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance or distress
(T. 713).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The defendant submits that the court erred in admitting
color photographs of Nyla Johnson.

The probative value of the

photographs was substantially outweighed by the prejudicial affect
upon the jury.
The defendant's requested jury instructions on manslaughter
should have been submitted to the jury.

The denial of those instructions

had the affect of directing a verdict of second degree murder
which effectively prevented the jury from considering the lesser
included offense of manslaughter.
There was insufficient evidence to sustain the verdict
of second degree murder.

Viewing the evidence most favorable

to the State, the verdict cannot be sustained.
The cumulative affect of the errors committed by the court deprive
the defendant of a fair trial and constitutes reversible error.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
INTRODUCTION OF PHOTOGRAPHS OF DEAD VICTIM CONSTITUTED
UNFAIR PREJUDICE AND IS A REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Evidence may be excluded at trial if, in the discretion
of the trial court, its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger that it would prejudice the jury against the defendant.
Utah R. Ev. 403 states that:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence. Utah Code Ann. Vol. 9B (Supp.
1984).
Here the defendant contends that the admission of five
photographs of the victim at trial over the objection of counsel
constitutes reversible error.
The process of evaluating the probity and prejudice inherent
in a particular piece of evidence can be a complex one calling
for a sifting of many disparate factors.

Among the central consideration:

in determining probative value are, first, "how strong a tendency"
the proffered evidence has to prove an issue of consequence in
the litigation and second the proponents need for the evidence.
United States v. Grassi, 602 F.2d 1192, 1195 (Fifth Circuit 1979).
Rule 403 also requires a trial court to determine the amount
of unfair prejudice resulting from the introduction of a piece
of evidence.

The phrase "unfair prejudice" does not refer alone
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to the fact that a particular piece of evidence will have adverse
effects on a party's case.
should have this effect.

Most evidence offered by an opponent

Rather, "unfair prejudice" within this

context means an undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper
basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.

Notes

of the advisory Committee on Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence,
28 U.S.C.A. Rule 403 at 102.

Relevancy is thus not the sole

test of admissibility of evidence:

admissibility depends, rather,

on a balancing of the various effects of the admission of such
evidence, considered in light of recognized rules of law governing
the administration of criminal law.
104, 109 (Ariz. 1968).

State v. Beers, 448 P.2d

Thus, the correct rule

is that exhibits

which may tend to inflame the jury must first be found relevant.
The trial court must then consider the probative value of the
exhibits and determine whether it outweighs the danger of prejudice.
In State v. Chappie, 660 P.2d 1208 (Ariz, 1983) the Court
held the

trial court erred by admitting pictures of the deceased

victim because the photographs did not have probative value as
to whether the defendant was in fact the perpetrator.

The fact

that the victim was Rilled, the medical cause of his death, and
what was done with his body after death were not in controversy.
Due to the lack of need for the pictures the Court held:
The matters illustrated by the photographs were
cumulative of uncontradicted and undisputed testimony,
as well as the subiect of a stipulation offered by
the defendant. We find, therefore, that the photographs
in question had little probative value on the issues
being tried and that their admission in evidence could
have almost no value or result except to inflame the
minds of the jury. Under such circumstances, there
was nothing for the trial court to weigh, nothing
on which its discretion could be exercised, and the
admission of the photographs was error.

_Id. at 1X16.
In United States v. Dolliole, 597 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1979)
cert, denied 99 S.Ct. 2894, the Court stressed the need, when
considering the probative value of evidence, to assess the prosecutor's
need for the evidence.

Here the Court of Appeals considered the

value of prior crime evidence, commenting:
When the government has ample evidence to establish
an element of the crime, the probative value of the
prior crime evidence is greatly reduced, and the risk
of prejudice which accompanies the admission of such
evidence will not be "justified.
The effect of stipulation on the Rule 403 balancing process
was examined in United States v. Spletzer, 602 ^.2d 1192 (5th
Cir. 1979).

At his trial, Spletzer, who was charged with escape

from a federal prison, offered to admit that at the time of his
escape he had been confined in a federal prison pursuant to a
judgment of conviction.

Despite this tender, the district court

permitted the government to introduce a certified copy of Spletzerfs
prior bank robbery conviction.

The Court held that the proposed

stipulation eliminated the prosecutorial need for the copy of
the judgment and that the district court abused its discretion
in admitting the copy.
In Oxendine v. State, 335 p.2d 940 (Okla. Crim. 1958), the
defendant argued that several pictures of the deceased victim
were of no probative value since there was no controversy as to
cause of death.

Oxendine admitted the shooting and his testimonv

was not in conflict with that of the state witnesses.

As in the

present case, the defendant testified under oath and admitted
all the details of the murder.

In reversing the lower decision

due to admission of the damaging photogranhs, the court stated:
In the case at bar there was no reason for the introduction
of the colored photo slides. There was no issue nor
controversy as to the cause of death. The defendants
admitted the crime in intricate detail. The photos
could not possibly lend assistance in the determination
of defendant's guilt. It was admitted. Had there
been a conflict as to the shooting or cause ot death
or location of uhe wounds, or an issue to which the
photos were relevant, then and in that event, they
would have been admissible had they been taken prior
to the performance of the autopsyId. at 943.
Utah courts have applied the Rule 403 balancing test in
numerous instances.

The earLy case of State v. Poe, 441 P.^d

512 (Utah 1968) saw this court reverse the defendant's rirst degree
murder conviction due ro tne unfair prejudice resulting from the
trial court's admission of certain photos of the victim.

The

pictures were taken during the course of an autopsy and later
displayed to the jury.

As in the present case, the identity of

the victim, his death, and its cause had already been established.
The Court found the inflamatory nature of the photographs outweighed
their probative value, concluding.
In the instant case they have no probative value.
All the material facts which could conceivably have
been adduced from a viewing of the slides had been
established by uncontradicted-lay and medical testimony.
The only purpose served was to inflame and arouse
the jury.
_Id. at 515.
In State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810 (Utah 1979) the court weighed
the impact of acceptance into evidence photographs of the murder
victim's bullet wound when there was no dispute as to the shooting
or cause of death.
court stated:

Even though the conviction was affirmed the

Because the defendant did not dispute shooting
Dirks, and because the medical examiner testified
that the victim died as a result of the gunshot, the
admission of the photographs was superfluous. We
do not condone the admission of the photographs in
this case, since we are able to find no evidentiaryvalue for the photographs other than the hoped for
emotional impact on the jury.

Xd. at 813.
In applying the Rule 403 balancing test to the facts of
the present case it becomes readily apparent that the photographs
should not have been admitted into evidence at trial.

There was

no probative value to the photographs since the defendant admitted
killing the victim and the graphic nature of the pictures was
clearly prejudicial.
The defendant initially argues the photographs should have
been excluded because they were not probative of any issue at
trial.

Counsel for the defendant, made it abundantly clear even

before trial, that it would not contest any issue as to the cause
and manner of Nyla Johnson's death.

Prior to trial, the defendant

submitted a motion in limine to suppress the introduction of the
photographs into evidence (T. 2-23).

The trial court was also

given a detailed memorandum, timely filed, outlining the defendant's
position.
Counsel for the defendant claimed during opening statements
that there would be no issue as to the death of the victim, the
cause of her death, that the defendant alone was responsible for
her death, and the time when the death occurred (T. 35-40).

Counsel

also indicated that there would be no disagreement as to the number
of wounds inflicted on the victim, the location of the wounds
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and all other facts surrounding her death (T. 40). In fact, counsel
argued throughout the trial that there was no issue in which the
defendant did not concur
In addition, the

with the state.
defendant testified, under oath, that

he was responsible for the victimTs death (T. 384). He described
in detail the circumstances leading up to the murder and his involvement
in that murder.

The defendant's testimony was in almost complete

agreement with the testimony of witnesses for the state.

In Oxendine

v. State, Supra, the Court, under similar circumstances held testimony
of the defendant sufficient to eliminate any need for photographs
in establishing elements of the charge.
The state also had the benefit of testimony from numerous
medical and lay witnesses.

Jeff Stami of the County Sheriff's

Office gave a detailed description of the scene of the crime and
presented a diagram of the apartment (T. 46-49).

Jane Niskala

and McKay Johnson, friends of the victim testified about the scene,
the location and position of the body and about the presence and
demeanor of the defendant (T. 49-67, 92-99).

Further details

of the condition of the deceased and the surrounding area were
provided by paramedics (T. 107-127).

Medical experts testified

as to the cause of death, including detailed descriptions of the
body and wounds (T. 179-218).
Virtually none of this testimony was contested by the defendant.
Each element of the crime was or could have been established through
the use of testimony and evidence other than the objectional photographs.
Such a situation forces the state to assume a greater responsibility
in establishing the need for the photographs.
Dolliole, Supra.

United States v.

Under similar circumstances, this court held

the admission of photographs to be an error in State v. Wells,
Supra.
In addition to the lack of probative value, the defendant
claims the photographs unduly prejudiced the jury to convict.
Two of the photographs that were submitted were enlarged, showing
in vivid color the details of the gory scene (State's Exhibit
6, 15) (T. 314). In each of the photographs the jury saw large
amounts of the victim's dried blood which had covered her face,
clothes and the surrounding carpet.

One picture of the deceased

(State's Exhibit 6) showed her finger extended in a defiant position
sometimes described as "giving you the finger".
The state also admitted several autopsy photographs (State's
Exhibit 40, 41, 42) showing various injuries to the deceased's
body (T. 314). The photographs were in color and clearly held
great emotional impact.
The defendant argues that the photographs were of such
a nature that their introduction into evidence constitutes reversible
error.

Although the admission of photographs is within the sound

discretion of the trial court, there are numerous cases which
state that an appellate court can and will reverse a trial court
when photographs are so inflamatory as to outweigh probative value
State v. Beers, Supra; Oxendine v. State, Supra, and State v.
Poe, Supra.

In assessing whether the admission of the photographs

into evidence was reversible, the crucial question is not whether
there is substantial evidence to support the judgment, but whether
the error affected the judgment.

United States v. Robinson, 544

F.2d 611 (2nd Cir. 1976) .
In State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, (Utah 1977), the Utah

Court stressed that a court may reverse a confiction if the error
is such that
"there exists a reasonable probability or likelihood
that there would have been a result more favorable
to the defendant in absence of the error.
Id. at 1352.
In this case, the photographs were clearly inflamatory
in nature.

Their vivid display of blood and gore would clearly

affect the emotions of even the coldest juror.
663 P.2d 60 (Utah 1983)

In State v. Garcia,

the Utah Supreme Court warned that

"the more inflamatory the photographs, the grater
the need to establish its essential evidentiary value."
I_d. at 64.
Yet, the record clearly demonstrates that the state had
no need for the photographs is establishing its case.

Each element

was established and agreed to at trial, even by the defendant
himself.

The use of the photographs at trial was clearly prejudicial

and cumulative of other testimony and exhibits.

Their introduction

into evidence clearly constitutes reversible error.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO GRANT MR. CLOUD'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS.
At the close of the trial, defense counsel requested three
instructions which supported the defendant's theory of the case.
Defendants requested instruction on manslaughter as a lesser included
offense was granted and is not at issue here.
Instruction No. 20, Appendix

A

(Defendant's requested

). The defendant did not dispute

1- In Garcia, the Court affirmed a defendant's second degree
murder conviction. Unlike the case at "hand, certain legal issues
"°^p ^nni-ested. making the photographs were relevant.

the existance of the elements of second degree murder, nor the
second degree murder instruction that was given.

However, defendant

requested a transitional instruction which asked the jury to go
beyond the elements of second degree murder and consider defendant's
diminished responsibility,
No. 21, Appendix

B

(Defendant's requested Instruction

) . According to this instruction, a homicide

which is otherwise second degree murder becomes manslaughter if
the defendant's responsibility is diminished.
refused to grant this instruction.

The trial court

The defendant through counsel

properly preserved objection to the court's denial

of this instruction

(T. 558).
The court properly instructed the jury of the elements
of Second Degree Murder in Instruction No. 18 (See Appendix

C

).

The next to last sentence of that instruction, however, without
the proper clarifying instructions requested by the defense, precludes
the jury from considering the lesser included offense of manslaughter.
That sentence is as follows:
"If the State has proved each and every one of the
foregoing elements to your satisfaction and beyond
a reasonable doubt then it is your duty to find John
Charles Cloud guilty of the offense of Criminal Homicide,
Murder in the Second Degree, as charged in the Information."
Utah's manslaughter statute reflects the theory of diminished
responsibility.

Specific consideration of the "extreme mental

or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation
or excuse" of the accused at the time of the homicide embodies
the theory of allowing consideration of evidence relevant to intent.
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-205 (1953 as amended).

The purpose of such

evidence is to establish, by negating the requisite intent for
a second degree murder, that in fact a lesser degree of offense

was committed.
In People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77,
386 P.2d 677 (1963) the court held that where the defense had
introduced substantial evidence of diminished responsibility,
the court must instruct as to the legal significance of the evidence.
Justice Traynor found the explanatory instruction was "necessary
for the jury to be fully and fairly charged upon the relevant
law."

I_d. at 682.

Although the question in State v. Henderson,

arose in the context of the trial court's failure to grant an
instruction on the defense of diminished responsibility, the rationale
applies here as well.

In State v. Cripps, Utah No. 19140 filed

October 26, 1984, this Court reversed a conviction of distribution
of a controlled substance because of a misleading jury instruction
in entrapment.

This court noted the risk that the instruction

"obscured the proper legal standard.

In the jurors' minds

..."

Id. at 5.
Without the requested instruction, the jury would necessarily
halt their deliberations at the second degree murder level because
they found a knowing and intentional killing.
in dispute.

That fact was never

However, they should have been additionally reauired

to view the knowing and intentional killing in light of evidence
of Mr. Cloud's extreme emotional disturbance.

If the jurors had

been instructed to apply evidence of Mr. Cloud's diminished responsibility
to what was an otherwise knowing and intentional homicide, their
deliberations would have properly progressed to consideration
of manslaughter.

Although the manslaugther instruction allowed,

for some consideration of Mr. Cloud's

diminished responsibility

its application was necessarily limited without the transitional

instruction.

As the instructions were given, the jurors had no

reason to even consider manslaughter.

The jury was never fully

and fairly charged as to the relevant law as required by the court
in People v. Henderson,

386 P.2d at 683.

As found by the California

Supreme Court in People v. Henderson, the jury must be instructed
on the significance of diminished capacity so they may properly
consider the actor's intent in determining the degree of his responsibili
The requested instruction might have prevented the jury from convicting
defendant of second degree murder.

Failure to grant defendant's

requested Instruction No. 21 constituted reversible error.
The second instruction, the denial of which Mr. Cloud now
appeals, required the jury to convict on the lower degree of homicide
if reasonable doubt existed as to which degree of homicide the
defendant should be guilty of.
No. 24, Appendix

D

(Defendant's requested Instruction

). Defense counsel properly preserved

objection to the court's denial of these instructions (T. 558).
The second disputed instruction would have required the
jury to convict on the lower degree of homicide if doubt existed
as to which degree of homicide the defendant should be convicted
of.
The language of the instruction is akin to the statutory
language of Utah Code Ann. 577-17-1 (1953 as amended);
"Doubt as to degree -- Convicted only on lowest. When
it appears the defendant has committed a public offense
and there is reasonable doubt as to which of two or
more degrees he is guilty, he shall be convicted only
of the lower degree."
In State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88 (Utah 1981) this Court announced
if an instruction is supported by evidence and its meaning is

.1 Q -

clear, the jury may be instructed in the form of statutory language.
The meaning of the statute is clear.

The court settled the question

of evidentiary support by granting the manslaughter instruction.
Failure to grant this reauested instruction violated the defendant's
right to have

the jury properly instructed as to the relevant

law in this case.
Failure to require the jury to convict on the lower offense
if they had reasonable doubt as to which degree of the offense
Mr.' Cloud was guilty of amounted to depriving Mr. Cloud of his
defense.

This, coupled with failure of the court to explain the

effects of diminished capacity as applied to an otherwise second
degree homicide denied defendant his right to a fair trial.

The

verdict must therefore be reversed.

POINT III
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT A VERDICT OF SECOND DEGREE HOMICIDE.
The standard for reversing a jury conviction is well established
If the evidence in a case is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable so that reasonable minds must entertain a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime the conviction must
be reversed.

State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983); State

v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Utah 1980).
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The evidence must be veiwed in a light most favorable to
the jury verdict.

State v. Kerekes, 1161, 1168.

Even stretching

the evidence to its logical limit, however, the court may not
take a speculative leap to bridge the gap between the evidence
needed to convict and the evidence actually presented at trial.
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 445.
The only contested issue at trial was John Cloud's state
of mind at the time of the homicide.

All of the testimony given

at trial is consistent with the defense that John Cloud was under
extreme mental or emotional distress for which there was a reasonable
excuse.

The prosecution witnesses verified that the couple had

been having an extended argument and that John Cloud was upset.
Bob Stone testified that John Cloud was very upset and drunk hours
before the homicide and Mr. Barton's and Bonnie Wilson's testimony
explains Mr. Cloud's misperception about Nyla's actions.

Most

importantly, the uncontested expert opinion of Dr. Louis Moench
established that John Cloud was under extreme emotional distress
at the time of the homicide.

Dr. Moench testified Mr. Cloud was

paranoid due to alcoholism and had a reactive personality.

Under

those conditions he felt there was a reasonable explanation for
John Cloud's actions.
In this case there is no evidence to support a jury verdict
of second degree homicide.

The defendant submits that viewing

the evidence in a light most favorable to the State reasonable
minds must entertain a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt
of second degree murder.

The judgment must therefore be reversed.

POINT IV
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF MISTAKES AT TRIAL CONSTITUTE
REVERSIBLE ERROR.
The defendant has raised several issues concerning his
conviction in the court below.

Each inadmissible photograph and

improper jury instruction and the insufficiency of the evidence
created reversible error in this case.

Although we cannot know

what evidence the jury considered in reading its verdict, the
amount of inappropriate evidence that was admitted in this case
cannot be ignored.
The cumulative effect, if not the individual errors, warrants
a new trial.

In Gooden v. State, 617 P.2d 248, 250 (Okl. Crim.

App. 1980), the State Court stated:
When a review of the entire record reveals numerous
irregularities that tend to prejudice the rights of
a defendant and where an accumulation of errors denies
a defendant a fair trial, the case will be reversed,
even though one of the errors, standing alone, would
not be ample to justify reversal.
The prejudicial effect of the errors in this cannot be
quantified.

Nevertheless, no juror could have ignored all of

the inadmissible evidence and improper court instructions.

The

judgment must be reversed.

CONCLUSION
John Cloud requests this Court reverse his conviction,
or, in the alternative grant him a new trial.

The introduction

of the gruesome photographs created an undue risk of substantial
prejudice against Mr. Cloud.

The refusal of the trial court to

submit the two ]ury instructions requested by defense counsel
effectively denied consideration of Mr. Cloud's defense by the
jury.

The evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain the verdict

of second degree murder.

Therefore, John Cloud, by and through

his attorney, respectfully requests that the conviction be reversed
or a new trial grantecL
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APPENDIX A

INSTRUCTION NO.

^

°

A person commits manslaughter, a Second Degree Felony,
if he;
(a)

Recklessly causes the death of another; or

(b)

Causes the death of another under the influence of

extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable
explanation or excuse.

'i*j

APPENDIX B

INSTRUCTION NO.

I I

When a homicide which would otherwise be murder in the
second degree is committed under the influence of extreme mental
or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation,
then the offense constitutes manslaughter.

'fv^

APPENDIX C

INSTRUCTION NO.

/ £

Before you may find the defendant, JOHN CHARLES CLOUD,
guilty of the offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second
Degree, the State must prove each and every one of the following
elements to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt:
1.

That on or about May 23, 1983, John Charles Cloud

unlawfully caused the death of Nyla Johnson; and
2.

That John Charles Cloud committed such act either;

(a)

intentionally or knowingly; or

(b)

intending; to cause serious bodily iniury to another,

committed an act clearly dangerous to human life; and
3.

That such acts took place in Salt Lake County, State

of Utah.
If the State has proved each and every one of the foregoing
elements to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt then
it is your duty to find John Charles Cloud guilty of the offense
of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, as charged
in the Information.

However, if the State has failed to prove

any one or more of such elements beyond a reasonable doubt then
you cannot find John Charles Cloud guilty of the offense of Criminal
Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, and should then consider
the lesser included offense of Manslaughter.

APPENDIX D

INSTRUCTION NO.

i-1

If you find that the defendant in this case has committed
a criminal homicide but you have a reasonable doubt as to which
of two or more degrees of that crime he is guilty, you must convict
him of the lowest degree only.
The crime of criminal homicide - murder in the second
degree - charged in the Information in this case, necessarily
includes the lesser offense of criminal homicide - manslaughter.

